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NOTES
WALDBA UM V FAIRCHILD PUBLICATIONS,
INC.: GIVING OBJECTIVITY TO THE
DEFINITION OF PUBLIC
FIGURES
A suit for defamation provides an avenue of legal redress for invasions
of an individual's interest in reputation and good name.' To recover damages, a plaintiff must prove that the defamatory comments injured his reputation and impaired his standing among his peers.2 An essential
consideration in any defamation action is the status of the plaintiff.
Whether a court' deems a person to be a private individual or a public
figure is of paramount importance in such actions because public figures
alleging defamation must prove the defendant published the defamatory

comments with actual malice,4 an exceedingly difficult task.' Private indi1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 11, at 737 (4th ed. 1971). The
tort of defamation is comprised of both libel and slander. Historically, libel has involved
written or printed defamation, although defamation by the electronic media is also libelous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1976). But see W. PROSSER, supra § 112, at
753-54. Slander, on the other hand, is oral defamation. In either case the interest protected
by the law of defamation is the same: society's "pervasive and strong interest in preventing
and redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). Both
forms of defamation require that something be communicated to a third person that may
affect an individual's reputation and good name. See W. PROSSER, supra § 111, at 739;
Eaton, The American Law ofDefamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and BeyondAn Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1975). A statement is defamatory if it
"tend[s] to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridi... Kimmerle v. New York Evening
cule, aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace.
Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933). The focus of this article is on the
definition of public figures in libel actions and, therefore, the term defamation shall refer
solely to libel.
2. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.1, at 349-50 (1956).
3. Whether a plaintiff is a public figure is a question of law for the court to resolve.
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 266 (1980). See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other.grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Note, The Applicability of the Constitutional Privilege to Defame. Question of Law or Question of Fact?, 55 IND. L.J. 389 (1980).
4. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
5. In a 1972 study of 52 cases applying the actual malice test to matters of public
interest, 39 found no actual malice, 4 found malice, and 9 were inconclusive. Comment, The
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viduals, by comparison, carry no such onerous burden. 6 The recent trend
in the United States Supreme Court has been to restrict the public figure
definition so that it encompasses relatively few plaintiffs.' Unfortunately,
despite the importance of this distinction between private individuals and
public figures, the Court has provided only a "skeletal description" 8 of the
elusive public figure concept.
Recognizing this deficiency, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc. ,' recently
provided detailed guidelines for determining whether a plaintiff is a Dubiic
figure. Focusing upon objective criteria, the court has attempted to eliminate the uncertainty plaguing this area of the law and, thus, to provide
guidance to other courts, the press, and the general public.
The plaintiff, Eric Waldbaum, was president of Greenbelt Consumer
Services, Inc., the second largest diversified consumer cooperative in the
country. Following his dismissal in 1976 as head of this cooperative,
Waldbaum alleged he was defamed by an article published in a newspaper
owned by the defendant, Fairchild Publications, Inc. This article stated
that, under his tenure, the company had been retrenching and losing
money. Waldbaum filed a civil suit alleging that the statement was defamatory in that it was false and had injured his reputation as a businessman.
Upon completion of discovery, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and ruled Waldbaum to be a public figure. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district
court's decision, and clarified the murky parameters of the public figure
concept.
This Note will examine the new public figure analysis offered in
Waldbaum and comment on its potential impact upon the press and defamation plaintiffs. It will trace the evolution of defamation from its common law roots through the recognition of constitutional restrictions on the
tort developed in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "
and its progeny. Focusing on the development of the public figure stanExpanding Constitutional Protection For the News Media From Liabilityfor Defamation." Predictabilityand the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1565-66 (1972).
6. Private individuals need only demonstrate that they have suffered some actual dam-

age to their reputation as a result of the defendant's publication of defamatory comments.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
7. See notes 43-101 and accompanying text infra.
8. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1292.
9. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 266 (1980).
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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dard, this Note will demonstrate the increasingly limited scope of this standard and Waldbaum's consistency with this trend.
I.

COMMON LAW DEFAMATION: PRESUMPTION OF MALICE

At common law, a libel plaintiff established a prima facie case by proving publication of a defamatory" statement that was understood by a third
party to defame the plaintiff with harm resulting to the plaintiff.' 2 The
defendant's malice was presumed from publication even if he had no animosity toward the plaintiff and believed the statements to be true. The
plaintiff did not have to prove that he suffered any actual harm from the
statement since this, too, was presumed. In effect, the defendant was held
strictly liable for publication of the defamatory comment. 3
To avoid liability, the defendant had to prove that the statement was
true' 4 or that he had either an absolute or a qualified privilege to publish
the statement. The absolute privilege was generally limited to government
officials who made defamatory comments in the course of their official duties."' The rationale behind absolute immunity was the public policy
favoring a government official's freedom of expression in the performance
of his duties.' 6
In addition to absolute privileges, there were also several qualified privileges which protected a private party from liability for his allegedly defamatory remarks. The most important qualified privilege, for the purposes of
this Note, was the fair comment privilege which protected the publication
of statements concerning the conduct and qualifications of public offi11. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976). See also note I
supra.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114,

at 776.
W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 113, at 771-73.
14. The defendant had to prove only that the statement was substantially true rather
13.

than true in all of its particulars. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS §

581A, Comment f

(1976), The earlier rule was that truth meant "literal" truth and thus slight factual inaccuracies would be held defamatory. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116, at 798. The severity and
absurdity of this rule led American courts to require only substantial truth. See, e.g., Florida
Publishing Co. v. Lee, 76 Fla. 405, 411-12, 80 So. 245, 246 (1918); Maguire v. Vaughan, 106
Mich. 280, 286, 64 N.W. 44, 46 (1895).
15. Absolute immunity was extended to such government officials as judges, jurors, legislators, and executive officers. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114, at 777-82. But cf. Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1978) (no immunity for federal official for acts beyond
scope of official duties).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114, at 776-84.
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cials. 17 This privilege was based on the belief that unfettered debate about
conduct of public officials was essential for an inpublic issues and the
8
'
electorate.
formed
In light of the common law, the Supreme Court consistently refused to
extend constitutional protection to any defamatory publication. 9 Finding
libel analogous to obscenity, the Court noted that "[it has been well-observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 2 In 1964, the Court reversed the trend of following
common law defamation principles in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,21
where first amendment 22 protection was extended to certain libelous comments.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION: NEW YORK TIMES AND ITS
PROGENY

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,23 the Court decided that the majority
fair comment rule, which protected comments and opinion but not false
17. There was considerable disagreement whether this privilege protected misstatements of fact as well as opinion. The majority rule limited the privilege to opinion, while a
minority of jurisdictions extended the privilege to include false statements of fact as well.
See W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 115, at 792, § 118, at 819-20. For further comment on both
absolute and qualified privileges, see Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 875, 917-31 (1956).
concurring) ("The effective
18. Cf.Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 577 (1959) (Black, J.,
functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the force of an informed
public opinion . . . .Such an informed understanding depends, of course, on the freedom
people have to applaud or criticize the way public employees do their jobs .... ").
19. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952) (dictum); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
715 (1931) (dictum).
20. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The plaintiff in this action was the police commissioner in
Montgomery, Alabama, who sued four Alabama clergymen and the New York Times for
libel resulting from a full page advertisement published on March 29, 1960. The advertisement, a solicitation for contributions from a civil rights group, consisted largely of descriptions of community and police mistreatment of some civil rights protestors. Although these
descriptions were substantially true, there were some slight factual inaccuracies which were
alleged to be defamatory. The plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages and the jury awarded
him the full amount. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25
(1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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statements of fact,24 was insufficient to protect the rights guaranteed by the
first amendment. To cure this deficiency, the Court adopted what had
been the minority rule and held that a public official is barred from recovering damages for defamatory comments about his official conduct unless
he proves with "convincing clarity"2 that the comments were made with
actual malice. The Court defined actual malice as either knowledge that
the statements were false or that they were made with a reckless disregard
for the truth.2 6 This protection covered not only defamatory comments
and opinions but also false statements of fact.27 Thus, the Court's holding
revolutionized the common law of defamation by extending constitutional
protection to an area of speech which the majority of jurisdictions had
previously held to be unprivileged.28
The impetus behind this new protection was the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ... . In order to guarantee the "breathing space" that freedom of expression needs to survive, the first
amendment compels the protection of even false statements of fact about
public officials.3" In the Court's view, forcing a critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all factual statements, at the risk of large libel judgments, would inevitably lead to self-censorship by the press. 3 1
This landmark ruling was soon followed by several decisions which generally expanded the scope of the New York Times rule. Two years later in
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 2 the Court stated that the minimum boundaries of the
public official category extend, at the very least, to those government employees who have or appear to have substantial influence over governmental affairs.33 To recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to
their official conduct, such plaintiffs must prove the defendants' actual
malice.34
In 1967, the Court further expanded the New York Times privilege by
extending it to statements about public figures as well as public officials.
24. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.

25. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
26. Id at 279-80.
27. Id. at 279-81.
28. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
county
at 87.
34.

376 U.S. at 270.
Id at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
376 U.S. at 279.
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
Id at 85. In Rosenblatt, the Court stated that the plaintiff, a former supervisor of a
ski area, might be a public official for the purposes of the New York Times rule. Id
Id. at 86.
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In two companion cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 35 and Associated

Press v. Walker,36 the Court ruled the plaintiffs to be public figures and
thus required them to prove the defendants' actual malice to recover in
their defamation actions." Although the plurality decision was announced by Justice Harlan, the controlling opinion was issued by Chief
Justice Warren.3 8 Holding that public figures fall within the New York
Times actual malice requirement, the Chief Justice observed that many
individuals of great influence who may not be holding public office at the
moment are nevertheless often "intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or by reason of their fame, shape events in the
areas of concern to society at large." 39 This was the only substantive definition the Court provided for the new public figure category. Chief Justice
35. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

36. Id
37. Id at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The plaintiff in Butts was the athletic director
at the University of Georgia. In March 1963, the Saturday Evening Post published an article accusing Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the University of Georgia
and the University of Alabama by supplying the Alabama coach information about Georgia's game plan before the game. In Walker, the plaintiff was a retired general who had
become an outspoken critic of school integration. Walker alleged that the Associated Press
published a defamatory news story accusing him of taking command of a violent demonstration protesting the enrollment of James Meredith at the University of Mississippi in September, 1962. In each case the jurors held in favor of the plaintiffs, with Butts being awarded
$460,000 and Walker $500,000. The Supreme Court, while ruling both plaintiffs public
figures, upheld the award in Butts, id at 161, but reversed the verdict in Walker, id at 16162. In Butts, the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren, see note 38 infra, found that
the plaintiff had proved the New York Times actual malice requirement by demonstrating
that the defendant's investigative techniques constituted a reckless disregard for the truth, id
at 170, but stated there was no such culpability by the defendant in Walker. Id at 165.
38. The opinion of Justice Harlan, which was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and
Forbes, held that recovery for public figures should be allowed "on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id at 155. Chief Justice
Warren, joined by Justices Brennan and White, contended that the New York Times "actual
malice" standard should include defamation of public figures. Id at 164. Justices Douglas
and Black, while maintaining their belief that the first amendment ought to allow much
greater freedom for the press, nevertheless agreed with the Chief Justice that, at the bare
minimum, the actual malice standard should apply to public figures. Thus, by a 5-4 split, the
controlling view that emerged was that public figures, as well as public officials, must prove
actual malice to prevail in a defamation action. For a thorough discussion of these two cases
and their somewhat confusing judicial alignment, see Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the
FirstAmendment." Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267.
39. 388 U.S. at 163-64. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion defined public figures in
slightly different words. He stated that one may attain the status of public figure by position
alone or by "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex'
of an important public controversy." Id at 155. However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court cited Chief Justice Warren's definition as controlling. Id.at
337.
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Warren noted, however, that "an important consideration that distinguished these public figures from private individuals is the fact that public
figures often have easy access to the media both to influence policy and to
respond to criticism of their viewpoints and activities."" Despite this significant advancement in constitutional protection for the media, Butts provided little guidance to lower courts as to what constitutes a public figure.
The expansion of first amendment protection for the press reached its
zenith in 1971 in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia." A plurality-Justices Brennan, Warren, and Blackmun-held that all defamation plaintiffs, whether
public figures or private individuals, must prove "actual malice" in order
to recover when the defamation involves a matter of public or general concern.4 2 This standard went significantly beyond any previous ruling by the
Court because now virtually any defendant could escape liability simply
by proving the defamatory comments concerned a matter of public or general interest. One of its effects, however, was to expose the problem of reconciling the individual's interest in his reputation with the need for a free
and uninhibited press. The fact that five separate opinions were issued
suggests that the Court was not completely comfortable with its holding.
The uneasiness with its decision was manifested three years later when the
Court effectively overruled Rosenbloom.
III.

GERTZ V ROBERT WELCH, INC.: REDEFINING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS

In 1974, the Court repudiated the Rosenbloom standard in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 41 It found that the public or general interest test not only
failed to serve the competing interests involved in defamation actions, 44
but also forced courts to decide on an ad hoc basis what qualified as an
40. 388 U.S. at 164.
41.

403 U.S. 29 (1971).

42. Id. at 43-44. The plaintiff, a distributor of nudist publications, was arrested by Philadelphia police on criminal obscenity charges but was subsequently acquitted. He sued the
defendant radio station for libel arising from its news report of his arrest which stated that
the confiscated magazines were "obscene" rather than allegedly obscene and characterized
the plaintiff and his associates as "smut distributors" and "girlie-book peddlers." The jury
awarded him $300,000 in damages. 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968). On appeal, the circuit
court reversed, holding that because the broadcasts concerned a matter of public interest-a
police campaign against obscenity-the plaintiff had to prove actual malice and had failed.
415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), aft'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
44. These competing interests were identified as the need for a vigorous and uninhibited
press versus the legitimate state interest in compensating individuals for harm inflicted by
defamatory statements. Id at 341-42.
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issue of public or general interest.45 The Court found that the balance
between the competing concerns struck by the Rosenbloom plurality
weighed too heavily in favor of the press at the expense of the individual's
reputational interests.46 Therefore, the Court rejected the contention of
the Rosenbloom plurality that whether the first amendment protects the
publisher of an alleged defamation depends upon the subject matter of the
publication.4 7 Instead, the Court selected a standard that focuses upon the
status of the plaintiff-that is, whether the plaintiff is a private individual
or a public figure.4 8
In Gertz, the issue presented was whether the publisher of a defamatory
falsehood about a private individual could claim a constitutional privilege
under the aegis of New York Times. The plaintiff, Elmer Gertz, was a
prominent attorney who had been retained by a Chicago family to bring a
civil rights action against a policeman who had shot and killed their son.
Gertz had long been active in community and professional affairs, serving
as an officer of civic and professional organizations, and had published
several books and articles on civil rights. In addition, Gertz had frequently appeared on national and local radio and television and had been
the subject of over forty articles in Chicago newspapers.4 9 The defendant
was the publisher of American Opinion, a monthly magazine espousing the
views of the John Birch Society. In March, 1969, the defendant published
an article which purported to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy
against local police as part of a nationwide communist plot. The article
discussed Gertz's involvement in the civil rights action against the policeman, and accused Gertz of having an extensive criminal record, of being a
communist, and of having framed the policeman. Each of these accusations was false"
Gertz sued for libel and the district court entered judgment for the defendant, concluding that even though the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure, the New York Times standard should govern any
discussion of a public interest." The court of appeals, relying upon the
45. Id. at 346.
46. Id.

47. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
48. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343-46; Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plainiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1175-83 (1976); text accompanying notes 68-69 infra.
49. Brief for Petitioner at 152-53 app., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323.
50. 418 U.S. at 325-28.
51. 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970). It should be noted that this holding presaged the
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. The district

court relied primarily on Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), an action involving a New
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intervening plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, affirmed the lower court's
ruling.5 2 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Gertz was neither a
public official nor a public figure.53 The Court remanded the case to the
state level for a new trial and directed the state to define the appropriate
standard of liability, short of strict liability, to be used for a publisher's
alleged defamation of a private individual.5 4
The Court acknowledged that for nearly a decade it had struggled to
strike the proper balance between the law of defamation and the constitutionally protected rights of free speech and freedom of the press.5 5 The
Supreme Court recognized that it was necessary to "lay down broad rules
of general application in order to end this struggle and provide proper
guidance to the lower courts." 56 It thus seized the opportunity to develop
the inadequate public figure definition supplied in Butts.5 7
At the outset, the Court identified two normative considerations underlying the distinction between private individuals and public figures. First,
public figures usually enjoy greater access to the media and therefore have
a better opportunity to rebut false statements. 8 Normally lacking such
media access, private individuals consequently are more vulnerable to injury.5 9 The second and more compelling consideration supporting the distinction is that public figures have voluntarily "thrust themselves into the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."6 Therefore, the media is entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily asYork privacy statute rather than a libel action. This reliance on Hill proved prophetic for it
was cited six months later by the Supreme Court in support of its proposition that first
amendment protection extends to publications involving matters of public or general concern. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 42.
52. 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972).
53. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
54. Id. at 347, 352.
55. Id at 325.
56. Id at 343-44.
57. See notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
58. 418 U.S. at 344. The Court recognized the weakness in this argument, noting, "[o]f
course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo the harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches
up with a lie." Id. at 344 n.9. Nevertheless, despite the fact that "the self-help of rebuttal,
standing alone, is inadequate to its task," id, it does offer a moderate advantage that generally is unavailable to a private plaintiff.
59. Id. at 344.
60. Id at 345. Although the voluntariness of the public figure's actions was a crucial
consideration, the Court recognized that one may become an involuntary public figure without any self-initiated action. However, the Court minimized this possibility, asserting that
"the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id.
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sumed the risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods. 6' By contrast, private individuals have surrendered no part of their interests in the
protection of their reputation and, as a result, are more deserving of recovery for injury inflicted by defamatory comments.6 2
In its analysis, the Court identified two tiers of public figures. The first
tier consists of the general-purpose public figure who achieves such overriding public recognition that he becomes a public figure for all purposes
and in all contexts. 63 The test is a strict one, for "[a]bsent clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in
the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life.",64 The second and more common tier is
comprised of those individuals who voluntarily inject themselves into a
particular public controversy and thereby become limited-purpose public
figures.65
In either case, those attaining public figure status "have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society" and therefore invite attention
and comment.66 To determine whether an individual is a public figure, the
pertinent examination is "the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 6 7 This
test is a marked departure from the subject matter orientation of the Rosenbloom plurality. Under Rosenbloom, the defendant is protected if the subject matter of the defamation involves a public controversy.6 8 Under
Gertz, the central inquiry focuses upon the plaintifis status within the controversy.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that despite Gertz's
long-standing involvement in professional and civic affairs, he was neither
an all-purpose nor a limited-purpose public figure.6 9 As a consequence of
61. Id.
62. Id For a thorough examination of these underlying considerations, see Note, supra
note 48, at 1187-221.
63. 418 U.S. at 351.
64. Id. at 352. Accord Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
65. 418 U.S. at 345.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 352.
68. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
69. 418 U.S. at 352. This result has been the subject of some criticism. One court emphatically stated that "[p]erhaps if attorney Gertz was not a public figure, nobody is."
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 910
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). In light of Gertz's active participation in numerous events and the media reports of his activities, there appears to be room for reasonable
disagreement about the Court's decision that Gertz was not a public figure. Perhaps the best
explanation of this result is that it was prompted by a policy determination by the Court that
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this restrictive application of the Court's public figure criteria, the scope of
the media's immunity was narrowed.7 °
IV.

POST-GERTZ: CONTINUING TO NARROW THE PRIVILEGE

In three cases succeeding Gertz, the Court reaffirmed its intention that
the public figure category be narrowly defined. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,71 the socially prominent former wife of a member of the Firestone
tire family sued Time magazine for libel for falsely reporting that her divorce had been granted on grounds of her adultery and extreme cruelty.7 2
Time contended that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure and that the nationally publicized divorce was a public controversy, thus rendering
Time's inaccurate reporting of the divorce privileged in the absence of any
proof of actual malice. 73 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
pointing out that despite the plaintiff's position of social prominence, she
assumed no role of especial prominence in the affairs of society and therefore was not a general-purpose public figure.7 ' Furthermore, the Firestone
divorce was not the sort of public controversy referred to in Gertz, despite
the interest it held for some segment of the public. Since Firestone was
compelled by the state to go to court for legal release from her matrimony,
her actions could not be classified as voluntary.7 5 Unfortunately, the
Court failed to further elaborate the requirements for a public controversy,
a key element of their analysis. It was unpersuasive to the Court that Mrs.
Firestone held several press conferences during the divorce proceedings,7 6
thus demonstrating that access to the media is a consideration of little significance to the Court in determining a plaintiffs public figure status.77
Moreover, in light of the plaintiffs prominence in her community, she conit could best protect an individual's reputational interest by applying the public figure criteria restrictively.
70. As another court has succinctly noted, "[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate." Sweeny v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942),

quotedin New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272. For further commentary on the
narrowing effect of Gertz, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV.
442 (1975); Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press- .4 Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20
N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 139 (1974).
71. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
72. Id at 450-52.

73. Id at 452-53.
74. Id. at 453.

75. Id at 454.
76. Id at 454 n.9.
77. This result may conflict with the Gertz statement that such access is an important

distinction between public figures and private individuals. 418 U.S. at 344. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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ceivably could have been defined as an all-purpose public figure. 7" The
Court's contrary conclusion is further evidence of its desire to limit the
application of this public figure category and demonstrates judicial deference to the libeled plaintiffs reputational interest.
In the 1978 term, the Court continued this narrowing trend in Hutchinson v. Proxmire.7 The plaintiff was a research scientist who had obtained
a series of federal grants to study the aggressive behavior of monkeys. The
defendant, United States Senator William Proxmire, contended in his
Golden Fleece Award, designed to expose egregious government waste,
that Hutchinson had "made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process
made a monkey out of the American taxpayer."8 " The district court concluded that Hutchinson's long and active involvement with publicly
funded research and the public interest in the expenditure of taxpayer
money to support such research made him a public figure. 8' On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 2 In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that Hutchinson was a public figure for the
limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal funds for research
projects.83 In the Court's view, Hutchinson had not .thrust himself into a
public controversy to influence others. A general concern over federal expenditures was not a public controversy and therefore was insufficient to
make Hutchinson a public figure.84 Moreover, despite his active pursuit of
78. Mrs. Firestone was an active member of the Palm Beach, Florida social circuit and
even employed a press clipping service to monitor media coverage of herself. 424 U.S. at
485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It would appear that under Gertz she might have qualified as
an all purpose public figure because she had acquired the requisite "general fame or notoriety in the community." 418 U.S. at 351-52. Although the Gertz Court failed to elaborate on
this point, a literal reading would lead one to believe that the scope of the individual's fame
or notoriety need extend only as far as the population in the plaintiffs community. However, after Firestone, it appears that a general purpose public figure's fame or notoriety must
extend somewhere beyond the local community.
79. 443 U.S. Ill (1979).
80. Id at 115-16. These statements appeared in the CongressionalRecord, a press release, and a newsletter. The implication of financial misconduct appeared to be the basis of
Hutchinson's libel action.
81. 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
82. 579 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. 443 U.S. at 134. Proxmire conceded that the plaintiff was not an all-purpose public
figure. Id In addition, the Court rejected Proxmire's assertion that the Speech and Debate
Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, protects a member of Congress for allegedly defamatory statements made by the member in press releases and newsletters. Id at
127-33. For a complete discussion of this other significant aspect of Hutchinson, see Note,
Legislative Immunity and Congressional Necessity, 68 GEO. L.J. 783 (1980).
84. 443 U.S. at 135. The Court stated that such a finding would make all recipients of
public research grants public figures. This would be equivalent to a subject matter classification, a public figure analysis which was rejected in Gertz. Id
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nearly one-half million dollars in federal funding and the publication of
numerous articles concerning his work in scientific journals, Hutchinson
had not invited the necessary amount of public attention and comment to
be a public figure.8 5
The Hutchinson decision has been criticized on the ground that by characterizing the disputed statement as representing merely a concern about
general public expenditures, 86 the Court distorted the crux of the dispute
which actually centered on the public funding of esoteric behavioral studies.87 Had the Court identified this as the public controversy, it is more
likely that in light of Hutchinson's active solicitation of funds to conduct
such research, the Court could have concluded that he had thrust himself
into the forefront of the controversy and thus had become a public figure
for the limited purpose of this controversy. Nevertheless, the Court declined to so define the public controversy. Thus, Hutchinson can be viewed
as another indication of the Court's desire to narrow the category of public
figures.
Finally, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn,88 the Court again reversed
the lower courts8 9 and ruled that the plaintiff was not a public figure. 90 In
1958, Ilya Wolston had been convicted on a contempt charge for failing to
respond to a subpoena of a federal grand jury investigating Soviet espionage in the United States. Wolston had made several previous appearances before the grand jury but had attracted no media attention.
However, his failure to appear and his subsequent contempt conviction
resulted in fifteen stories in New York and Washington newspapers. 9' The
defendant puballeged defamation occured sixteen years later when the
92
lished a book characterizing Wolston as a Soviet agent.
The federal appellate court had reasoned that, by failing to appear
before the grand jury, Wolston had voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the investigation and thereby
had become a limited-purpose public figure. 93 The Supreme Court rejected this logic, finding instead that the plaintiff had been "dragged un85. Id.
86. Id

87. See Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment in the 1978 Term. Diminishing
Protectionforthe Media, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1979).

88. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
89. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), af'd, 578 F.2d
427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
90. 443 U.S. at 161.
91. Id at 161-62.
92. Id at 159.
93. 578 F.2d at 431.
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willingly"9 4 into the controversy and had not "engaged the attention of the
public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved." 9 5
The Court could find no basis to conclude that Wolston had relinquished
concluded that he had
any interest in protecting his name and therefore
96
remained a private individual at all times.
As in Firestone and Hutchinson, the result in Wolston could have been
different if the Court had applied the Gertz standards less restrictively.
The Court might have found that Wolston's voluntary decision not to answer the subpoena, a decision which had attracted media attention, made
him an involuntary public figure, a category of public figures reluctantly
acknowledged in Gertz.7. While the Court declined to so hold, the feasibility of such a finding demonstrates the major flaw of Gertz: its lack of
developed methodology and objective criteria has led to malleable applications and inconsistent results. 98 Several courts have followed the restrictive trend of Gertz and its progeny and have refused to find an individual
to be a public figure if any part of Gertz is unsatisfied.99 Other courts have
taken a more liberal stance and have held several plaintiffs to be public
figures despite their apparent desire for obscurity.'0° In an attempt to
94. 443 U.S. at 166.
95. Id at 168.
96. Id.
97. 418 U.S. at 341. See also note 60 supra.
98. See Comment, supra note 87, at 1037-39. Remarking on the lack of clear guidance
in Gertz, one court has aptly noted that "[diefining public figures is much like trying to nail a
jellyfish to a wall." Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga.
1976).
99. E.g., Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (former elected representative and active politician did not thrust himself into controversy involving attorney's suspension from practice); Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va. 1979)
(homicide defendant had not assumed a role of special prominence as a result of the criminal charges); Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (exconvict with lengthy criminal record had not voluntarily thrust himself into controversy
surrounding investigation of former labor leader's disappearance); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp.,
453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978) (police informant never attempted to publicize his role or
views regarding drug traffic); Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 441 F.
Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (land sale corporation did not thrust itself into forefront of land
fraud controversy); Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (former high echelon executive in major corporation did not inject himself
into a public controversy).
100. E.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (former professional football player a public figure because of well publicized trade and contractual dispute); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978) (attorney charged
with fifteen count securities indictment was a public figure because of his involvement in
fraudulent scheme leading to indictment); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978) (reputed underworld figure a public figure because of previous media
reports of his activities); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
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eliminate such results in this "confused and meandering state of affairs,"'' the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia recently offered a detailed public figure analysis to supplement the skeletal
guidelines offered by the Supreme Court.
WALDBAUM V FAIRCHILD PUBLICATIONS, INC.: FLESHING OUT

V.

THE SKELETON

From 1971 through 1976 Eric Waldbaum was the president and chief
executive officer of Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., a diversified consumer cooperative that in the early nineteen-seventies ranked as the second largest such cooperative in the country. During his tenure as
president, Waldbaum was active in managing the cooperative and in advocating certain supermarket industry standards. He supported the introduction of consumer oriented practices such as unit pricing and open dating.
As president of a consumer-owned franchise, he believed his job should
extend beyond the balance sheet to include the advocacy of consumer oriented policies.'0 2 During his presidency, twenty-two articles about Greenbelt appeared in various publications, ten of which mentioned Waldbaum
by name. These articles concerned various aspects of Greenbelt, including
Waldbaum's appointment as president, Greenbelt's financial reports, the
competitors through its advertisements, and its
cooperative's criticism of its
10 3
efforts in oil exploration.
On March 16, 1976, Greenbelt's board of directors dismissed Waldbaum
as president. Following this action, Supermarket News, a national trade
publication owned by the defendant, Fairchild Publications, Inc., ran a
brief article on Waldbaum's ouster. The article stated in part that Greenbelt "has been losing money the past year and retrenching.""
On Septemer 28, 1976, Waldbaum filed a libel action in United States
U.S. 1013 (1978) (plaintiffs, sons of public figures, were themselves public figures because of
extensive publicity surrounding the trial of their parents); Ethridge v. North Miss. Communications, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (undercover policeman was both a public
official and public figure because his activities were known to officials in the community and

were the subject of public debate); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328
(D.D.C. 1978) (defendant in criminal proceedings became a public figure by voluntarily

injecting himself into police undercover operation).
101.

Comment, Libel Law- .4 Confused and Meandering State ofAffairs, 6 CUM. L. REV.

667, 667 (1976).
102. Walbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1299 n.35 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 266 (1980) (quoting deposition of Eric Waldbaum).

103. 627 F.2d at 1290 n.3.
104. Id at 1290. The body of the article reads as follows:
WASHINGTON (FNS) - Eric Waldbaum has been replaced as president of Green-

belt Consumer Services.
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District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the disputed statement was false and that its publication had damaged his reputation as a
businessman. He sought $75,000 in compensatory and exemplary damages.
Upon completion of discovery, Fairchild moved for summary judgment,
contending that Waldbaum was a public figure. Since Waldbaum had
conceded that the article was published without actual malice, Fairchild
argued that he was barred from recovering. On February 15, 1979, the
district court granted Fairchild's motion and held that Waldbaum qualified as a public figure for the limited purpose of the controversy concerning "Greenbelt's unique position within the supermarket industry and
Waldbaum's efforts to advance that position."'' 5 Waldbaum appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which affirmed the
lower court's ruling."°6
Judge Tamm, writing for the court, began by briefly reviewing New
York Times and its progeny, focusing upon the Gertz public figure analysis
and its subsequent applications. He then stated that "[u]nfortunately, the
Supreme Court has not yet fleshed out the skeletal descriptions of public
figures and private persons enunciated in Gertz."'1 7 The absence of such
guidelines, in the court's view, created a possible chilling effect on the dissemination of constitutionally protected ideas since "members of the press
might choose to err on the side of suppression when trying to predict how a
court would analyze a news story's first amendment status."'' Furthermore, the court reasoned that a lack of clarity might also deter citizen participation in public affairs. The fear of having no redress for injury might
force an individual to refrain from voicing his views on public issues and
therefore shy away from entering the public arena.' °" The court recognized that to guard against these possibilities, both the press and the genRowland Burnstan will serve as acting chief executive office [sic] until a new
president is named. Burnstan, an independent management consultant and economist, has worked for various Government agencies and businesses.
Greenbelt said part of his interim job will be to locate a new president for the coop, which has been losing money the past year and retrenching.'
Waldbaum had served as president since 1971. His plans are not known.
Id
105. Waldbaum v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., No. 76-1810, slip op. at 15
(D.D.C. Feb. 15, 1979), affid sub nom. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d
1287 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 266 (1980).
106. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 266 (1980).
107. Id at 1292.
108. Id at 1293.
109. Id
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eral public need some objective criteria from which they can fashion their
behavior.
The court then announced the standards courts' '0 should use to distinguish between public figures and private individuals."' Although
Waldbaum conceded that he was not a general-purpose public figure," 2
the court nevertheless devoted a significant portion of its opinion to the
delineation of a precise definition for such a figure. 1 3 This definition of a
general-purpose public figure was supplied in an apparent effort to influence future decisions, although it may be considered dicta.
To be deemed a public figure for all purposes, the court noted, an individual must be a celebrity whose name is a household word." 4 The public
must follow his words or actions with great interest, either because his
words or actions are worthy of attention or because the individual has actively pursued this public recognition.'
Several factors may be useful to
a court in determining whether an individual should be deemed an allpurpose public figure." 16 Surveys of the plaintiff's name recognition, pre110. The court maintained that this issue is one for the court to resolve. Id. at 1293 n.12.
This is grounded in the belief that jurors are less qualified than judges to make the intricate
distinctions necessary to the resolution of this issue. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578
F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). Furthermore,
allowing juries to make this decision heightens the possibility that "juries will use the cloak
of a general verdict to punish unpopular ideas or speakers." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,
88 n. 15 (1966). See Note, The Applicability of the ConstitutionalPrivilegeto Defame. Question
of Law or Question of Fact?, 55 IND. L.J. 389 (1980).
111. As in Gertz and its progeny, the court identified two justifications for this distinction: the availability of the media for rebuttal and the fact that, by entering the public arena,
a public figure has voluntarily assumed the risk that the exposure might lead to misstatements about him. 627 F.2d at 1294.. See also notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
The court also posited that a public figure may attempt to return to an anonymous position
in society but be thwarted by continuing public interest and media attention. Since he remains able to reply to attacks through the press, he retains a certain amount of power and
influence. Therefore, an individual may properly be deemed an involuntary public figure
despite his efforts to renounce publicity. 627 F.2d at 1295 n.18. See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345; note 60 supra. The analysis in Waldbaum continues the two
tier approach of Gertz, which distinguished between all-purpose and limited-purpose public
figures, but Waldbaum provides more definitive standards.
112. 627 F.2d at 1298.
113. See notes 114-20 and accompanying text infra.
114. 627 F.2d at 1294.
115. Id. This definition is essentially the same as that supplied in Gertz. 418 U.S. at 35152. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. However, the court added significantly to
Gertz by providing valuable commentary concerning the appropriate methodology to be
used in applying this definition.
116. The court stated that sometimes position alone can make one a public figure. 627
F.2d at 1299 n.36. See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 254,
267 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). Many well-known athletes, entertainers, and other personages are often courted to endorse commercial products
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vious press coverage, and the effect of his actions upon the conduct or
ideas of others provide some evidence of the plaintiffs status." 7 In making its determination, a court must view the facts objectively and ask
whether a reasonable person would conclude8 that the public is attentive to
the plaintiffs ideas, conduct, or judgment.' "
In its discussion, the court expanded upon some incidental comments by
the Supreme Court" 9 concerning the scope of public recognition necessary
for an individual to be deemed a public figure for all purposes. The court
stated that an individual's fame need not extend nationwide. Instead, the
plaintiff need be known only to a large percentage of the general population in the area where the defamation was published. 2 ° Thus, in essence,
Waldbaum has shifted the focus from the plaintiffs community recognition to his fame within the area of media circulation. This appears to be a
desirable extrapolation since an individual is injured by defamatory comments only in the geographical area in which the comments are disseminated. To require nationwide fame when the defamatory publication is
circulated in a limited area would so severely limit the size of the all-purpose public figure category as to make it of little significance.
Although few individuals will ever be deemed public figures for all purand to support political candidates. This power to capitalize on one's general fame by lending one's name to products, candidates, and other causes is a good indication of the broad
influence and recognition that an individual commands. 627 F.2d at 1294. However, the
court cautioned that categorization of public figures solely by position should be avoided
since such an analysis is equivalent to the forbidden subject-matter classification. Id at 1299
n.36. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456.
117. 627 F.2d at 1295. The court stressed that these factors must be examined as they
existed before the defamation was published. Otherwise, the press could use the defamation
itself as a medium to convert a plaintiff into a public figure by creating a controversy concerning the defamation. Id at 1294 n.19. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135
("those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure").
118. 627 F.2d at 1292-94 n.15. This requirement of looking "through the eyes of a reasonable person at the facts taken as a whole," id at 1292, has not been specifically adopted
in Supreme Court opinions dealing with the public figure question. But cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (whether a publisher has acted improperly in making defamatory comments should be determined by the reasonable man standard). With the
adoption of this objective approach, the defendant's own subjective belief as to whether the
plaintiff was a public figure is of no legal importance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580A, Comment c (1976). Focusing upon what a reporter, editor, or publisher
actually knew or believed can introduce subjective elements that are difficult to prove and
even more difficult to predict. 627 F.2d at 1293. An objective approach allows both the
press and the individual to gauge the public figure status with an ascertainable norm. Id at
1294.
119. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 351-52. See also note 78 supra.
120. 627 F.2d at 1295 n.20, 1295-96 n.22.
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poses,' 2' there are nevertheless many persons who attempt "to have, or
realistically can be expected to have, a major impact on the resolution of a
specific public dispute that has foreseeable and substantial ramifications
for persons beyond its immediate participants."'' 22 To identify these limited purpose public figures, the court delineated a three-step analysis.
The first step is to isolate the particular public controversy involving the
plaintiff. 23 A public controversy is not merely a matter of public interest.
Instead, it must be a "specific public debate that has foreseeable and sub124
stantial ramifications for persons beyond its immediate participants."'
Matters essentially of a private nature do not become public controversies
121.

Id at 1296. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 352 ("Absent clear

evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the
affairs of society an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of
his life.").
122. 627 F.2d at 1292. Compared to the scant definition offered in Gertz (limited purpose public figures are those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved," 418 U.S. at 345),
the Waldbaum description is much more explicit and demanding. Under the Waldbaum
definition it is probable that fewer defendants will successfully prove a plaintiff's public
figure status. See notes 142-43 and accompanying text infra.
In a libel action, when a media defendant claims qualified privilege protection to comment upon the activities of a public figure, the claim of privilege constitutes an avoidance
and must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. E.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986
(8th Cir. 1972); Drummond v. Spero, 350 F. Supp. 844 (D. Vt. 1972). See also White v.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 417 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1969). In raising an affirmative defense, the defendant carries the burden of proving all elements of the defense. Therefore, when a defendant claims that the allegedly defamatory comments were privileged
because the plaintiff was a public figure, the defendant has the burden of proving the plaintiffs public figure status. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, Comment c (1977)
(where burden of proof lies as to facts concerning plaintiffs public figure status is unsettled).
If the defendant is unsuccessful in proving the plaintiff is a public figure, then the plaintiff
may recover as a private individual if he is successful in establishing his prima facie case.
See notes I 1-13 and accompanying text supra. However, if the defendant successfully establishes the public figure privilege, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat the privilege by
proving either the defendant's actual malice or his abuse of the privilege. See, e.g., Zuschek
v. Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aJJ'd, 571 F.2d
573 (3d Cir. 1978).
123. 627 F.2d at 1296. In Gertz, the Court failed to specify what it considered a public
controversy to be although it is a crucial element in the public figure definition. See 418
U.S. at 351. The Court has never directly addressed this issue, although peripherally the
Court has stated what does not qualify as a public controversy. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. I 11, 135 (1979) (a general concern over federal expenditures is not a public controversy); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (divorce proceedings are not the sort
of "public controversy" referred to in Gertz).
124. 627 F.2d at 1292. This is essentially a reaffirmation of the Gertz repudiation of the
general or public interest test advanced by the Rosenbloom plurality. See notes 43-48 and
accompanying text supra.
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simply because they have sparked the public's curiosity.' 2 5 Judge Tamm
cautioned, however, that courts are forbidden to question the legitimacy of
the public's interest in a nonprivate dispute. Otherwise, courts would become censors of "what information is relevant to self-government."' 26 In
sum, in determining whether a public controversy exists, the court must
view the facts objectively and ask whether a reasonable person would exramifications for perpect the dispute to have forseeable and substantial
27
sons beyond the immediate participants.
Once it has been determined that a public controversy exists," 28 the second step in the court's analysis is to determine the plaintiffs role in the
controversy.' 29 Expanding upon the Gertz requirement that the plaintiffs
status within the controversy be of a "special prominence,' 30 the court
stated that the plaintiff "must have been purposely trying to influence the
outcome or realistically have been expected because of his position in the
controversy, to have an impact on its resolution."t Among the relevant
factors a court may view in ascertaining the plaintiffs level of involvement
are his previous conduct, the amount of media coverage he has generated,
and the public reaction to his actions and statements.' 32
In the third and final step of its inquiry, a court must determine whether
the alleged defamation was "germane" to the plaintiffs involvement in the
controversy. 33 Comments wholly unrelated to the controversy remain un125. 627 F.2d at 1296. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55.

126. 627 F.2d at 1297.(quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
127. 627 F.2d at 1297.

128. If no public controversy exists, the inquiry should go no further since the dispute
would be of a private nature, and therefore the New York Times privilege would be unavailable. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
129. 627 F.2d at 1297.
130. 418 U.S. at 351.
131. 627 F.2d at 1297. Cf.Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (the public official
category extends to those government employees who have, or appear to the public to have
substantial influence over governmental affairs).
132. 627 F.2d at 1297. Although the court failed to state how distant in time these factors
should be viewed, the court did not limit its present examination to Waldbaum's tenure as
Greenbelt's president. Instead, it also viewed his activities prior to joining Greenbelt. Id.at
1299. This is consistent with a prior analysis undertaken by the same court. Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), aft'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). There, both the district court and the court of appeals considered
Wolston's entire life history in deciding his public figure status. The Supreme Court decided
that Wolston was not a public figure, but expressed no opinion as to whether such an expansive range of facts is relevant in determining the public figure issue.
133. 627 F.2d at 1298. This requirement does not appear explicitly in any Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the public figure issue. But cf.Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 77 (1964) (comments about the personal attributes of a public official such as dishonesty

1981]

Defining Public Figures

protected by the New York Times privilege.
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case before it, the court concluded that Waldbaum was a limited-purpose public figure and on this
basis affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. The court found that the innovative policies pioneered by Greenbelt "34
' had created a public debate that would affect consumers in the
Washington, D.C. area and beyond. 13 The court found that two public
controversies existed: first, the commercial viability of cooperatives, and
136
second, the wisdom of Greenbelt's innovative policies.
Proceeding to the second step of its analysis, the court examined the role
Waldbaum had played in these controversies. Finding that Waldbaum
had taken an active part in the cooperative's controversial actions, 137 the
court decided that a reasonable person would conclude that Waldbaum
had "thrust himself" into the aforementioned public controversies. 38
Finally, the court applied the third step of its inquiry and found that the
allegedly defamatory article, which reported that Greenbelt had been losing money, was germane to the controversy surrounding the cooperative's
innovative marketing approach. The court viewed the commercial success
of Greenbelt as relevant to the question of whether other firms should implement similar policies. Therefore, the publication was protected under
the New York Times rule.' 3 9 Since Waldbaum, as president of Greenbelt,
had assumed a position of great influence within a specific area and had
used the position to advance controversial policies substantially affecting
or improper motivation are germane to the official's fitness for office and are thus protected
under New York Times). A possibly more direct source of this requirement appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, Comment c at 217-18 (1976) (whether a defamatory statement affects a public figure in a manner germane to his capacity as a public figure
is a question of federal constitutional law).
134. The court identified these controversial supermarket policies as unit pricing, open
dating, and competitive advertising. 627 F.2d at 1299.
135. Id
136. Id.
137. Id at 1299 n.35. The court quoted the district court's language that Waldbaum
"did not become merely a boardroom president whose vision was limited to the balance
sheet. He became an activist, projecting his own image and that of the cooperative far beyond the dollars and cents aspects of marketing." Id at 1300 (quoting Waldbaum v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., No. 76-1810, slip op. at 12 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 1979)).
138. 627 F.2d at 1300.
139. Id The court stated that in advocating innovative merchandising practices,
Waldbaum assumed the risk that the press might comment upon the profitability of enterprises under his leadership. It concluded that the commercial success of these enterprises was
relevant to the public debate over whether other supermarkets should adopt similar policies.
Id.
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others, he became a public figure for the limited purposes of that debate. 4 0
VI.

THE EFFECT OF WALDBAUM: MAY THE MEDIA AND CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES BEWARE

The Waldbaum court has provided other courts a proper methodology
and more precise guidelines for deciding the threshold question of whether
a plaintiff qualifies as a public figure. Although the court found
Waldbaum to be a public figure, the guidelines and analysis are generally
consistent with the Supreme Court's post-Gertz trend of protecting the
plaintiff's reputational interest by reducing the media's first amendment
privilege. One effect of the decision is that the restrictive guidelines concerning public controversy and the plaintiffs participation within such
controversies have substantially increased the burden the media must bear
to prove the plaintiff is a public figure.' 4 ' However, the court's third requirement, that the defamation be germane to the plaintiffs participation
in the controversy, may be sufficiently malleable to allow for expansive
applications. The curious aggregation of these restrictive and expansive
requirements has produced a result possessing several significant ramifications for the media and certain private individuals.
In Gertz, the Supreme Court stated that to be a public figure one must
assume a role of "special prominence" in a certain "public controversy."
The Waldbaum court has construed these two crucial concepts restrictively. The public controversy must have both foreseeable and substantial
ramifications for members of the general population.' 4 2 If such a dispute
does not exist, the plaintiff will not be deemed a public figure and the
inquiry goes no further. Moreover, the plaintiffs level of involvement in
the dispute must be such that he possesses either the ability or the desire to
have a major impact in the resolution of the dispute. He must play a significant role in the controversy-tangential participation will not suffice.' 43
Again, if this rigid requirement is not met, the plaintiff should be considered a private individual.
By establishing such strict standards for determining public figure status,
the court has created several immediate and long-range effects. Among its
immediate effects, the stringency of these standards makes it less likely that
a plaintiff will satisfy each requirement. Unless the defendant can prove
that the plaintiff fulfills each requirement, a court should deem the plaintiff
140. Id.
141.
proved
142.
143.

The plaintiffs public figure status is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and
by the defendant. See note 122 supra.
627 F.2d at 1297.
Id
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to be a private individual. Thus, fewer media defendants should be able to
prove successfully a plaintiffs public figure status. Indeed, it is arguable
that such a stringent burden of proof for the defendant nearly creates a
presumption against holding a plaintiff to be a public figure.'" At a minimum, such exacting standards decrease the scope of the media's first
amendment privilege since the public figure category will be limited to
relatively few plaintiffs.
A further consequence of the narrow public figure standards developed
by the Waldbaum court is that the availability of summary judgment on
the issue of the plaintiffs public figure status is likely to be curtailed.' 4 5
Traditionally, summary judgment has been an effective method for media
defendants to avoid the burden and expense of full litigation.' 46 Since
under the Waldbaum standards fewer plaintiffs will be held to be public
figures, it follows that fewer defendants will prevail in establishing the
plaintiff's public figure status at the summary judgment level. This result
will force defendants to litigate fully this issue in court, a long and expensive process.' 4 7 The possibility of such costs may chill dissemination of
free speech by forcing a publisher without substantial financial resources
144. Such a presumption would almost certainly create a chilling effect upon the dissemination of constitutionally protected information and ideas. The knowledge of such a presumption might persuade a member of the media to refrain from publishing material when
an individual's public figure status is in question.
145. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment for the moving party shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of proving that there exists no genuine issue of any material fact. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727, at 524-25 (1973). However, the adverse party
may not rely merely upon general allegations to show the existence of a genuine issue for
trial. He must set forth specific facts that establish the existence of such an issue. FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(e).
The two most common issues in motions for summary judgment by media defendants in
defamation actions are: first, whether the plaintiff is a public figure; second, whether the
defendant published the defamation with actual malice. Of these two issues, a summary
judgment motion is most often made and granted upon the actual malice issue. See, e.g.,
Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, 602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979); Arnheiter v. Random
House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551
(E.D. Mich. 1979). While the issue of summary judgment on the actual malice requirement
is significant, it is beyond the scope of this Note. The present discussion is limited to the
availability of summary judgment on whether the plaintiff is a public figure. For a valuable
commentary on defendants' use of summary judgment on the actual malice issue, see Note,
The Role o/Summary Judgment in PoliticalLibel Cases, 52 S.CAL. L. REV. 1783 (1979).
146. Id at 1794-1801.
147. This analysis presumes that the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
actual malice issue is unsuccessful.
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to refrain from publishing a story when a person's public figure status is
uncertain.
In contrast to these strict standards, the requirement that the defamation
be germane to the plaintiffs participation in the controversy is susceptible
to broad application. The only limitation imposed by the court is that false
This
statements wholly unrelated to the controversy are unprivileged.'
relatively lax requirement conceivably could permit all but the most irrelevant statements to receive the New York Times protection. While it is almost certain that the court did not intend such a result, a literal reading
would appear to permit it. Perhaps such expansive language was intended
to counterbalance the restrictiveness of the other two requirements.' 49 After successfully completing the first two steps, the defendant must then satisfy the relatively easy burden of proving only that the statements were not
wholly unrelated to the plaintiffs participation in the particular controversy. The potential expansiveness of this requirement's application is
well evidenced in the court's conclusion in Waldbaum that the statements
about Greenbelt's financial status were germane to Waldbaum's support of
Waldbaum
innovative marketing policies. Thus, the court concluded, 150
could be properly considered a limited purpose public figure.
The court's analysis also raises a serious question as to whether many
prominent business executives might be deemed limited-purpose public
figures for the range of their business activities.' 1 In the court's view,
while Waldbaum was head of Greenbelt, he took an active role in such
public controversies as the cooperative form of business and Greenbelt's
consumer-oriented policies, such as unit pricing and open dating. He was
the "mover and shaper' 15 2 of the cooperative's controversial actions and
extended his and Greenbelt's images into areas beyond mere profit maximization. From these facts, the court concluded that Waldbaum had
thrust himself into these public controversies 5 3in an attempt to influence
other firms and their merchandising policies.'
Waldbaum's role as president of this innovative company, however,
would appear to differ very little from that which any prominent business
executive would assume. Virtually every company president is expected to
148. 627 F.2d at 1298.

149. It is questionable whether such an intent could be realized since it is only after
satisfying the first two difficult elements that the defendant confronts this less restrictive
burden.
150. 627 F.2d at 1300.

151. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30-35, Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications,
Inc., No. 79-2064 (June 27, 1980).
152. 627 F.2d at 1300.
153. Id.
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be a "mover and shaper" of the company's actions. As head of the second
largest cooperative of its kind, it was inevitable that Waldbaum would assume an active role in advocating the cooperative's policies-in fact, it was
expected of him.' 54 Therefore, it appears that he became a public figure
not because of his role in public controversies, but rather as a result of his
position as president of a controversial company. This closely resembles
the forbidden subject-matter classification, for it subjects all leading executives of controversial or innovative companies to public figure status.'
The court anticipated this criticism and attempted to discount it by stating that "[bleing an executive within a prominent and influential company
does not by itself make one a public figure."' 5 6 To avoid public figure
status, however, the executive must limit his role to being "simply a conduit for announcing and administering company policies made by
others."' 5 7 This would appear to be an unworkable definition in the modem business world because one does not become and remain the president
of a leading company by being a mere figurehead. Instead, attaining and
continuing in this position usually requires acting as a vigorous and outspoken proponent of company policies. More often than not, such activity
is simply part of the job. As a result, within the analytical framework developed in Waldbaum, most high echelon business executives would probably become public figures by their position alone. In light of the
Hutchinson and Firestone prohibitions of such subject-matter classifications, the validity of such a proposition is debatable.
The restrictive construction of the public figure test announced in
Waldbaum is generally harmonious with the recent Supreme Court decisions in this area. This can be seen by the fact that under the Waldbaum
analysis, the public figure status of the plaintiffs in Firestone, Hutchinson,
and Wolston would be the same as that found by the Court in each respective case. In Firestone, 158 it seems apparent that the plaintiff would fall
within the ambit of neither the all -purpose nor the limited-purpose public
figure definitions of Waldbaum. Although Mrs. Firestone might have been
well known within the Palm Beach social circuit, she certainly was not a
celebrity of national repute. Since Waldbaum requires that the plaintiffs
fame extend to a large percentage of the population within the area of
154. Id at 1299 n.35.
155. Such subject-matter classifications are prohibited by case law. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456; Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. at 344-46; note 84 supra.
156. 627 F.2d at 1299.
157. Id.
158. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.
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media circulation' 5 9 and the alleged defamation was published in a national magazine, Mrs. Firestone would fall outside of the all-purpose category.
The inquiry into Mrs. Firestone's limited-purpose public figure status
would be equally brief. Waldbaum makes clear that a public controversy
must have ramifications which will be felt by those beyond the dispute's
direct participants. 160 Since the public would be unaffected by the ramifications of the plaintiffs divorce in Firestone, no public controversy would
exist. The court's inquiry, therefore, would go no further and the plaintiff
would be deemed a private individual.
Applying the Waldbaum analysis to the facts of Hutchinson,161 again a
court would hold the plaintiff to be a private individual. Since Hutchinson's name was in no way a household word, his inability to satisfy the all
purpose public figure criteria seems clear. Furthermore, even if a court
found, as at least one commentator has suggested,' 6 2 that a public controversy existed concerning federal funding of esoteric behavioral studies, it
does not appear that Hutchinson's position would enable him to have a
major impact on this controversy as required by Waldbaum. 63 Prior to
receiving the Golden Fleece Award, Hutchinson occupied a position
shared by countless other research scientists. There is no evidence to support the belief that through his position or his reputation among his peers,
he possessed the ability to have a substantial influence upon such a controversy. Hutchinson would, therefore, fail to fulfill the second step of the
Waldbaum analysis and would be deemed a private individual.
Finally, the plaintiff in Wolston 164 would also be considered a private
individual under Waldbaum by failing the second step of the analysis. Assuming a court found that a public controversy existed over the investigation of the presence of Soviet espionage agents in the United States,
Wolston's position within this controversy was so trivial as to preclude an
ability to affect the resolution of this issue. His role was limited simply to
testifying before a grand jury, a role doubtlessly shared by many other
innocent participants in the investigation. His fleeting fame resulted not
-from any major role he played or sought to play in this controversy, but
rather from his professed psychological inability to appear before the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See
627
443
See
627
443

notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
F.2d at 1296. See notes 124-28 supra.
U.S. 111 (1979). See notes 79-87 and accompanying text supra.
Comment, supra note 87, at 1036.
F.2d at 1298. See notes 129-33 and accompanying text supra.
U.S. 157 (1979). See notes 88-96 and accompanying text supra.
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grand jury.'6 5 His nexus with the controversy was at best tangential and
therefore falls far short of the demanding Waldbaum criteria for a limitedpurpose public figure.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The analysis developed in Wa/dbaum is generally consistent with the
restrictive approach applied by the Supreme Court since Gertz. By developing rigid guidelines in an effort to aid other courts confronted with the
troublesome public figure issue, Wa/dbaum will have a twofold effect.
First, its strict standards will make it more difficult for the defendant to
prove the plaintiff is a public figure, thus strengthening the plaintiffs
chances of recovering in defamation suits. Second, these stringent standards will decrease the scope of the media's immunity from defamation
actions by limiting the scope of their qualified privilege. The impetus behind these effects is the desire to protect the private individual's legitimate
interest in his good name. However, one must question whether such prophylactic protection for the individual's reputational interest has not effectively eroded the "breathing space" that New York Times sought to secure
in order to ensure vigorous and uninhibited debate on public issues.
Whether such an ominous effect will be generated by Waldbaum remains
to be seen. It does seem certain, however, that under Waldbaum the media's task in convincing a court of a plaintiffs public figure status will be
exacting.
Thomas H Suddath, Jr.

165. 443 U.S. at 162.

